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Perhaps there are no more central themes in philosophy then 
those which involve the nature of truth. Yet surprisingly, the issue 
regarding the nature of truth itself, an issue which in its essential 
character impinges upon every other issue and problem has at least 
in regard to its substantive character achieved scant attention on 
the part of our major modern philosophic traditions. While the 
issue of truth has been the object of much focus in the analytic 
tradition, this focus has almost always been deflationary in 
approach. Following Tarski these redundancy or disquotational 
accounts embody a conviction that at bottom truth has no 
substantive content. 
The neglect to seriously reflect upon the substantive character 
of truth is even more surprising in light of the contemporary 
polarization of our philosophical world into two all but mutually 
exclusive modes of thinking and discourse. While again and again 
this polarization is lamented as destructive to the integrity of 
philosophical thought, it is not entirely clear what the ultimate 
roots of this dichotomy are or how it might be effectively 
transcended. While the ambiguity of this situation defies any 
simple solutions it might simultaneously provide inspiration for 
experimental thinking. In such a spirit a primary reflection upon 
the nature of truth in our human experience might effectively 
provide a passageway out of the current impasse in which 
philosophy finds itself. 
In a philosophical context, a context which is present albeit in 
different ways in both the analytic and the continental traditions, 
the issue of truth is unique in its power to wrest attention away 
from peripheral concerns toward the integrity of a vital center of 
meaning. Simply expressed, the issue of truth in human experience 
has universal significance for thought, even if it is not simply and 
only 'truth' which embodies this significance, but anything we 
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can know or name as truth, even 'meaning' and 'significance' 
themselves. 
The issue of truth in human experience has been a persistent 
theme throughout the work of Martin Heidegger. Since Heidegger's 
collected work consists of an enormous five hundred volumes, a 
responsible attempt to treat the topic of truth in a general way in 
Heidegger's work as a whole is clearly impossible within the scope 
of a small paper. Moreover given the complexity of the issue of 
truth itself, coupled with its interconnectedness with the meaning 
of Being in Heidegger's work, a full exposition of Heidegger's 
concept of truth would itself be too unwieldy to manage. How 
then to proceed? 
We must begin with a forthright recognition of the problematic 
character of our enterprise. Our goal is to render Heidegger's 
understanding of truth intelligible to an analytic audience largely 
unfamiliar with his language and methodology. What is 
presupposed here is that Heidegger has indeed achieved a 
fundamental understanding of the character of truth and one which 
is enormously significant in any philosophical context. Yet this 
claim will require justification. Inevitably when attempting to 
justify claims across philosophical traditions, such endeavors turn 
on the issue of methodology. Yet Heidegger's phenomenological, 
historical, hermeneutical methodology is both complex and, at least 
within the context of analytic philosophy, problematic in its 
unfamiliarity. An attempt to fully justify this methodology would 
require at least three separate proofs, to say nothing of the attempt 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of how these methods work 
together. To make a beginning we have selected one of these 
methods, the historical, and have made it the focal point of our 
examination. Accordingly our theme will be not simply 
Heidegger's concept of truth but an attempt to justify Heidegger's 
historical approach to the issue of truth. 
While the issue of truth like that of Being is most often 
interwoven with the fabric of a general ongoing problematic in 
Heidegger's work, indeed as will become clear it is futile to attempt 
to surgically separate the two issues. Nevertheless, from a purely 
structural point of view our task is ostensibly made easier by the 
fact that Heidegger has addressed the issue of truth in at least four 
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separate places in his work. The first of these is in section 44 of 
Being and Time. The second is in a small essay entitled "Vom 
Wesen den Warheit," ("On the Essence of Truth"). Up until recently 
these were the two primary sources for an understanding of 
Heidegger's theory of truth. In the early 80s this situation changed 
with the publication of two series of lectures which Heidegger 
presented shortly after the publication of Being and Time. The 
first was from a lecture course in 1927 under the title The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. In sections 295-320 Heidegger once 
again directly addresses the issue of truth in human experience 
along with concomitant topics such as 'significance, 5 'assertion' 
and 'meaning.' The second was from a lecture course given in 
1928 and published under the title The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic. The publication of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 
and The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, along with another 
series of lectures delivered shortly before the publication of Being 
and Time in 1927 and released under the title History of the Concept 
of Time, have been highly significant events for Heidegger 
scholarship in America. 
Through these series of lectures a new generation of scholars 
has come to understand firsthand what the actual students of 
Heidegger such as Walter Biemal had told us long ago, namely 
that like Hegel and Kant before him Heidegger, notoriously abstruse 
in his written texts, was likewise remarkably clear and lucid in his 
classroom presentations.1 Since there is often a striking section-
by- section correspondence between these lectures and Heidegger's 
written works, they have come to be employed as the definitive 
reference sources for Being and Time. The method of exegesis of 
Being and Time with close textual support from Basic Problems 
and History has been fully utilized in two of the latest and most 
important works of Heidegger scholarship: Hubert Dreyfus's 
Being-in-the-World and Richard Polt's Heidegger. The former, a 
landmark work in Heidegger studies, became the first to employ 
this method and in it the author acknowledges the profoundly 
important role that that Heidegger's early lectures have played in 
what has become the state-of-the-art commentary on Being and 
Time. 
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The impact upon our understanding of the early Heidegger 
lectures has been so marked that just as we have since Richardson 2 
routinely though not without ambiguity separated the Heideggerian 
body of work into Heidegger I and Heidegger II, so it is now 
tempting to divide Heidegger commentary into pre- and post-early 
lecture discovery periods, though needless to say these two 
divisions in no manner overlap. Significantly enough, the post-
early lecture Heidegger is more palatable in an Anglo-American 
context. If the reluctance to fully encounter Heidegger in the Anglo-
American world can in part be attributed to Heidegger's own 
obfuscating language and to the charge initiated historically by 
Rudolf Carnap that such language betrays fundamental logical 
confusions then the post- early lecture Heidegger is more 
conceptually clear because he is more linguistically precise. Again 
and again we are discovering that the most obscure and ambiguous 
aspects of Heidegger at bottom express thoughts which are clear 
and insightful albeit not immune to critical challenge. Neither 
should the actual text of Heidegger be immune to such challenges 
even within a Heideggerian context. Indeed the early lectures are 
now employed to the extent of correc t ing fundamental 
inconsistencies within the text of Being and Time.3 
Notwithstanding the indisputably important role these new 
series of lectures have had on Heidegger scholarship generally in 
and through their influence on interpretation of Being and Time, a 
practical question emerges at this point: Can one simply draw 
freely from the above texts in an attempt to construct a unified 
theory of Heidegger's historical approach to truth? Any attempt 
to do so must counter certain obstacles. The first is that the most 
likely source for additional material, History of the Concept of 
Time has no section corresponding to section 44 of Being and Time, 
although the issue of truth is directly discussed there in an 
abbreviated form. A more complete discussion is instead found in 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology (295-320). Why should this 
fact prove problematic? As indicated earlier utilization of Basic 
Problems for clarification of issues in Being and Time has become 
indispensable in Heidegger scholarship. Yet some caution is still 
in order. 
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In the table of contents of Being and Time Heidegger indicates 
that the entire project will consist of two parts. Each of these is in 
turn subdivided into three sections. The only sections which are 
actually contained in Being and Time are sections one and two of 
part one, roughly 1/3 of the entire project. All the rest has not been 
published or written, at least not in the original form in which it 
was conceived. In a footnote to the beginning of Basic Problems 
Heidegger tells us that this book contains the material which was 
announced as section three of part I of Being and Time. Hence we 
should not expect that Basic Problems simply reiterates the material 
contained in Being and Time, or rather to the extent that the material 
is repeated it is done so in a unique Heideggerian sense, in the 
sense of wiederholen. It is in this sense that Being and Time is 
altogether a retrieval. It is a retrieval both of the roots of Western 
culture and of something which takes place in experience all the 
time. Specifically section three was meant to continue the retrieval 
begun in section two of the analysis of Dasein but now from the 
point of view of temporality. 
Ultimately any attempt to utilize both Being and Time and any 
post Being and Time writings must come to terms with the thorny 
issue of the Kehre (turn) in Heidegger's thinking. If indeed 
Heidegger's thinking underwent a fundamental change after Being 
and Time, then the exercise of lumping together pre and post Being 
and Time writings to form a unified doctrine on a particular issue, 
for example, truth would involve quite a precarious move. How 
can this situation be effectively handled? While the issue of 'the 
turn' in Heidegger is a tremendously complicated affair one fact 
remains clear, namely that where there is a transition in Heidegger's 
thinking it is one which takes place within an overarching 
continuity. So much is this the case that it can be said that the 
necessity of a turn is already written into the table of contents of 
Being and Time itself. Once we are thoroughly grounded in the 
logistics of the Heideggerian project, once the primacy of the 
Seinfrage as well as the priority of Dasein is understood, then the 
Kehre no longer appears as an obstacle to the exegesis of the 
Heideggerian text. To be sure, fundamental differences as they 
affect our attempt to formulate a unified theory of Heidegger's 
historical approach to truth must be noted. 
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What then is Heidegger's historical method and how is it 
applied in attempting to formulate the essential character of truth? 
While there are unique aspects to Heidegger's historical approach 
to philosophy, in essence the historical-philosophical method itself 
maintains there is an intrinsic connection between our philosophical 
history and the ongoing creative process of philosophical thinking 
itself. Thus, practitioners of an historical method deny that a 
necessary separation can be made between our philosophical 
history and ongoing philosophical research. This is to say that 
practitioners of an historical method deny that philosophical issues 
should or can be explored in a purely analytical manner with 
minimal reference to their historical origin development and 
situatedness within an original context of meaning. As a 
paradigmatic historical thinker one would expect Heidegger's 
exploration of the issue of truth to begin with the traditional concept 
of truth as adequation, and whether we turn to Being and Time, to 
Basic Problems, or to "On the Essence of Truth" we are not 
disappointed in this expectation. 
Heidegger 's most complete discussion of the historical 
dimension of the nature of truth is contained in "The Essence of 
Truth." There he engages in an extended commentary of both the 
traditional Aristotelian concept of truth and its medieval 
reformulation. Yet from a more critical perspective we should ask: 
why would an essential or fundamental reflection on the nature of 
truth at all require an historical approach? Why not rather simply 
treat the issue in terms of the requisite features of truth in a manner 
common to both the analytic and the phenomenological methods? 
The fact that Heidegger in at least three of his extended treatments 
approaches the issue historically indicates that such a move is 
intrinsic to his method. Yet we might ask: why is the content of 
what has been thought about the character of truth in the past 
essentially connected with the essence of truth itself? In attempting 
to answer this question it is important to recognize from the start 
that Heidegger's historical method is not practiced in isolation 
from either the phenomenological or hermeneutical methods. 
Although Heidegger's reflections intrinsically involve explorations 
into our philosophical past, his essential starting point is 
hermeneutical. The hermeneutical method originally began as an 
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attempt to find a method adequate to the interpretation of sacred 
texts. With time this enterprise of thought branched out to include 
literary and philosophical texts as well. The fundamental 
presupposition of hermeneutics is that the empirical scientific 
method is not adequate to an interpretation of texts within the 
human sciences or geisteswissenshaften. Heidegger's use of the 
method of hermeneutics represents what might be called the 'third 
phase' of the development of the method. In this phase not only 
texts but experience itself becomes the object of interpretation. 
With its explicit acceptance of the circular character of all 
interpretation the hermeneutical method stands in marked contrast 
to the phenomenological which aims to make philosophy in 
Husseri's words "a rigouous science." Yet even though Being and 
Time is dedicated to Husserl, Heidegger's former teacher, it is clear 
that Heidegger rejects Husseri's ideal of a philosophy which can 
be scientific. Nevertheless Heidegger's approach is deeply 
phenomenological . The issue of the relationship between 
Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology is a complex one. 
One thing they share in common is a rejection of a speculative 
approach to philosophy in favor of faithfulness to the data of 
exper ience . In this manner the hermeneut ica l and 
phenomenological methods although traditionally opposed, as 
practiced by Heidegger coincide at least at one point. Both 
Heideggerian phenomenology and hermeneutics posit experience 
as the primary object of philosophical research. 
Heidegger's opening section of "On the Essence of Truth" is 
entitled: "The Usual Concept of Truth." Thus he begins not simply 
with an historical fact but with the fact that this historical concept, 
namely truth as adequation, represents as well our prevailing 
concept of truth. This fact raises an essential question for thought: 
has the traditional concept of truth as adequation prevailed because 
it represents the essence of truth itself, or has our prevailing concept 
of truth at least to some extent been inherited in the form of a 
philosophical tradition? 
At this point something of the sense of Heidegger's historical 
method should begin to emerge. In a minimal sense the historical 
method can be understood as involving an exercise in critical 
reflection. It aims to insure that the credentials of our inherited 
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concepts are subjected to critical examination regarding their 
authenticity. Without such historical awareness it is all too easy 
for unexamined presuppositions to slip through the checkpoint of 
cri t ical awareness . Why not then s imply examine our 
presuppositions more carefully? Such an exercise could obviously 
be carried on with little or no historical awareness. This might 
constitute an overwhelming objection against an historical 
approach were it not for the fact that presuppositions which are 
meant to be examined occur within anterior frameworks which 
are themselves presupposed. 
Why not then simply examine the second set of 
presuppositions, or rather identify, in the case of each philosophical 
issue, what the total set of presuppositions is? Clearly this is a 
method which is followed by most analytic philosophers as well 
as by pure phenomenologists. Such a method involves a 
commitment to philosophy as a kind of presuppositionless science. 
Heidegger would undoubtedly reject this kind of paradigm for 
philosophy and he would do so in part on the basis of considered 
objections regarding both the desirability as well as the possibility 
that philosophy can ever achieve the status of science. Much of 
the earlier sections of History of the Concept of Time, as well as 
corresponding sections of Being and Time, involve a critique of 
the kind of disinterested knowledge which would make a purely 
analytical approach to philosophical issues possible. 4 One essential 
aspect of this critique contains the insight that the essential 
parameters in which understanding operates, the social, cultural, 
historical frameworks which constitute a given context of 
understanding at any time, are not simple presuppositions which 
can be made fully explicit in the manner of steps in a logical proof. 
Thinking in any given era takes place within a ' space ' of 
possibilities which is historically constituted. 
Paradoxically one of the fundamental aspects of Heidegger's 
historical method is that through its application we are offered the 
possibility of a detailed kind of understanding of the limitations 
of any particular tradition including our own. Philosophical 
traditions limit understanding as well as provide access to the kind 
of insight which is universal. In a reflection upon the relation of 
philosophical analysis to tradition in an early section of Being and 
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Time, Heidegger writes: "Dasein simultaneously falls prey to the 
tradition of which it has more or less explicitly taken hold." 5 On 
the next page Heidegger continues: "When tradition thus becomes 
Master, it does so in such a way that what it 'transmits' is made so 
inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather 
becomes concealed. Tradition takes what comes down to us and 
delivers it over to self evidence; it blocks our access to those 
primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts 
handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn." 6 
Given the manner in which philosophical traditions constitute the 
very frameworks in which thinking operates, historical awareness 
can then be seen as an intrinsic aspect of critical philosophical 
thinking. 
In a masterful deconstructionist interpretation of Heidegger, 
Reiner Schurmann attempts to articulate Heidegger' understanding 
of how this 'space' of possibilities opened up in any given era is 
historically constituted. "How does it happen that a Duns Scotus, 
although surnamed Doctor Subtilis, could write neither a critique 
of pure reason nor a genealogy of morals? How does it happen, in 
other words that, a domain of the possible and the necessary is 
instituted, endures for a time and then cedes under the effect of a 
mutation? How does it happen?" 7 Schurmann's questions, although 
they are meant to be merely a starting point of his analysis in 
Heidegger on Being and Acting, wonderfully illustrate the 
correctness of Heidegger's insight into how the frameworks in 
which thinking operates in any given era are constituted by 
presuppositions which can never be made fully explicit. In 
historical hindsight, we intuitively know that it was not possible 
for Duns Scotus to write a critique of pure reason. This fact alone 
gives support to Heidegger's concept of the historical constitution 
of the space of possibilities of thinking which it is meant to explain. 
Given the foregoing considerations, an historical approach to 
philosophical issues would seem at the very least to be a plausible 
method of exerc is ing cri t ical awareness with regard to 
philosophical issues. In the absence of this method the analytic 
philosopher-phenomenologist must by necessity progress from the 
point of simply exercising critical awareness with regard to 
fundamental presuppositions as they effect a philosophical issue 
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under consideration to an enterprise which defines, even consumes, 
the character of questioning itself. In the necessity embodied in 
such a methodology of tracing assumptions back to an original 
presuppositonless ground, essential insights such as could have 
been provided by an historical method have been lost. Indeed the 
analytic philosopher would be closed to such insights. Philosophy 
becomes transformed into a method of pure analysis. 
In defense of the analytic philosopher it might be said that the 
presupposition of philosophy as science does not involve the 
necessity of following a chain of reasoning back to a self-
authent ica t ing ground in the case of every topic under 
considerat ion, but rather that apodict ic certainty mere ly 
characterizes the ideal of philosophy itself. Philosophy practiced 
after the paradigm of science clearly allows for its practitioners to 
'stop' and focus at any step along the line of a chain of reasoning. 
Heidegger could easily acknowledge this point but would 
nevertheless point out that the precise point where analysis is 
focused, the philosophical problems which occupy us for 
generations at a time are, in large measure historically determined. 
Here a case in point would be the modern focus upon 
epistemological questions, the 'problem' of the existence of the 
external world, of 'other minds,' etc. In Being and Time, and more 
so in Basic Problems, Heidegger works hard to 'lay bare' the 
ontological foundations which led to this very particular modern 
problematic. 8 Whether or not Heidegger's analysis is correct is a 
complex question. The fact that Wittgenstein, operating with a 
purely analytical method largely concurs with Heidegger on the 
manner in which modern epistemological issues are pseudo 
problems, 9 has done much to enhance the status of Heidegger in 
the Anglo-American philosophical world. But whether or not 
Heidegger's analysis is entirely correct, at the very least his thinking 
indicates that philosophical problematics have an historical basis, 
and that therefore an historical method can be relevant to their 
analysis. 
At this point there is no better way to continue to illustrate the 
character of Heidegger's historical method then to see how it is 
concretely employed in "On the Essence of Truth." Let us then 
refocus upon our original question of whether the traditional 
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concept of truth as adequation represents the essence of truth itself, 
or to what extent this concept has prevailed because it has been 
inherited in the form of a philosophical tradition. 
If these two possibilities were mutually exclusive then the 
question would lose much of its force. Philosophical traditions 
are not simply inherited en masse oblivious to critical examination. 
However, Heidegger never doubts that truth as adequation 
represents a legitimate aspect of our human experience of truth. 
Thus he is not offering us a new and original theory of truth at all 
but one which attempts in a Kantian manner to make fully explicit 
the ontological foundations of truth as adequation. In Being and 
Time he writes: "Our analysis takes its departure from the historical 
conception of truth and attempts to lay bare the ontological 
foundations of that conception. 1 0 In doing so Heidegger notes that 
the traditional definition of truth as Veritas est adaequatio rei et 
intellecuts can be taken in two ways: either as the correspondence 
of intellect to thing or the reverse. To eyes less historically 
discerning the distinction might seem superfluous, even spurious. 
The two statements "truth is a conformity of intellect to thing" 
and "truth is a conformity of thing to intellect." are ostensibly 
equivalent. Yet Heidegger insists that these two formulations are 
by no means the same even though they nevertheless share a 
concept of truth as conformity. The most recent medieval definition 
of truth is Veritas as adaequatio rei ad intellectum (truth as the 
conformity of thing to intellect).1 1 
By such a formulation the medievals understood the essential 
character of conformity, in terms of which truth is defined to be 
not simply the conformity of the human mind to what is real but 
the conformity of the created world to the divine intellect. It was 
God understood as the primary ontological ground of the created 
world, including the human intellect, which made possible truth 
as conformity between the human intellect and what is external to 
it. "Veritas as adaequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum (divinum) 
guarantees Veritas as adaequatio intellectus (humani) ad rem 
(creatum)" (page 121). 1 2 
It is clear that Heidegger identifies 'correspondence between 
thing and intellect' as the medieval expression of adequation while 
'correspondence between thing and intellect' is considered the 
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paradigm of truth in modern experience. Yet his claim is 
problematic since he neglects to name any particular figure or time 
frame within the vast medieval period. When we think of the 
medieval concept of truth as correspondence inevitably we think 
of Thomas Aquinas. 
Yet in Being and Time Heidegger identifies Thomas Aquinas 
doctrine of truth as "adaequatio intellectus et rei"n When we 
turn to Heidegger's discussion of truth in Basic Problems we find 
little in the way of clarification. Apart from the obvious 
discrepancy the deeper question is whether He idegge r ' s 
understanding of the medieval concept of the essence of truth as 
adequation between created world and divine intellect would 
nevertheless adequately describe Aquinas view or the medieval 
doctrine generally. 
One might suspect that once the concept of God no longer 
functioned as the primary ontological ground of what is real then 
the concept of creation itself would have become superfluous. For 
Heidegger however the truth is more subtle. The concept of 
creation did not entirely dissolve but instead was replaced by faith 
in the power of human reason to forge its own objects. From a 
modern vantage point the world does not simply appear as a brute 
fact of nature but as the product of human design. "The 
theologically conceived order of creation is replaced by the capacity 
of all objects to be planned by means of worldly reason." 1 4 
It should be obvious that such a state of affairs is conducive to 
maintaining the concept of truth as correctness. Now in modern 
experience the correspondence which makes for correctness is 
between concepts and the external world which is the product of 
human creation. What is it that provides support for the concept 
of truth as correctness, stripped as it has now become from a more 
enduring ontological foundation? Heidegger credits the 
"domination of the obvious." 1 5 This is to say that apart from a 
more essential ontological ground which might be revealed by 
reflective thought, everyday 'common sense' concepts come to 
prevail. Where 'common sense' prevails over reflective thought it 
becomes all too obvious that the essential character of truth resides 
in correctness, and thus it becomes superfluous to make truth into 
a problem. 
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Although he does not develop the theme at this point, elsewhere 
Heidegger has articulated how the concept of truth as correctness 
receives massive though inexplicit support from the modern 
technological 'will to power.' 1 6 Given the ubiquitous influence of 
the modern technological drive toward mastery over nature, it is 
plausible to think that such a powerful and pervasive force in 
modern experience becomes in effect ' read back ' into our 
understanding of truth. Truth is thus understood as correctness 
because the latter supports the interest of technological mastery, 
an interest to which we as moderns have given our allegiance in a 
manner which is logically prior to any reflective act of thinking 
about truth. 
Undoubtedly Heidegger could be challenged at this point by 
arguing the reverse, namely that it is an understanding of truth as 
correctness, an understanding which is essentially accurate that 
has made the achievement of modern technology possible to begin 
with. Thus for Heidegger to implicate the rationality which 
functions in the development of technology as corrosive to truth is 
tantamount to a confusion of categories of meaning. Heidegger is 
in fact aware of this line of criticism. His response to it is to admit 
that a certain understanding of truth has contributed to the 
development of technology but to deny that the reverse is not also 
the case. 1 7 The relationship between our modern understanding of 
truth and technology is a complex issue which can never be 
exhausted by any simple, one- directional cause-effect type of 
framework of understanding. The complex relationship between 
truth and modern technological rationality is an issue which 
Heidegger has worked hard to articulate. 
It might be tempting to think that Heidegger has provided two 
essentially different answers to the question of why in our modern 
experience truth is understood as correctness: one in "On the 
Essence of Truth" ("the domination of the obvious") and the other 
in "The Question Concerning Technology" (technological 
rationality). Upon reflection however it is very difficult to 
distinguish these two arguments. If it is "common sense" in the 
form of the "domination of the obvious" which in large measure 
constitutes our modern understanding of truth, that "common 
sense" is itself historically determined. Our present "common 
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sense" experience is one which has been thoroughly pervaded by 
modern technological rationality. Thus for us moderns "common 
sense" and technological rationality at least in part coincide. 
The above has been put forward by way of attempting to 
understand the basic structure of Heidegger's historical argument 
in section 1 of "On the Essence of Truth" ("The Usual concept of 
Truth"). What can be said by way of critical evaluation of it? It 
should be clear that Heidegger is challenging the concept of truth 
as correctness by means of an historical derivation. Thus the 
concept of truth as correctness is called into question by 
demonstrating its historically derived character. If Heidegger had 
claimed such a derivation as a sufficient basis for the falsity of the 
concept of truth as correctness then he would have obviously 
succumbed to the genetic fallacy. Yet once again his argument is 
too complex for this charge to have any justification. His historical 
derivation of truth as correctness, an exercise which is itself 
developed in terms of a larger historical context of awareness, is 
only the first half of a larger argument which will directly examine 
the character of truth itself. Heidegger's final judgment regarding 
the character of truth is determined only on the basis of evidence 
suggested by both aspects of his argument. 
The historical derivation which comprises the first half of his 
argument functions in part to raise doubts concerning truth as 
correctness. Once truth as correctness is seen as historically derived 
it appears no longer unimpeachable in character but founded upon 
that historical context in which it first acquired meaning. In this 
regard the first part of Heidegger's argument functions in a manner 
which is not dissimilar to the way in which arguments for ethical 
relativism attempt to conclude to the relativism of moral values 
based upon premises which indicate facts concerning cultural 
relativism. If indeed moral values are culturally and historically 
derived, then this fact alone is reason to raise fundamental questions 
concerning the character of moral value even if it is not a sufficient 
basis to conclude without further argument to the truth of ethical 
relativism itself. 
It is difficult to fault Heidegger on this move. If a serious 
argument can be made to the effect that once in the history of 
Western thought the concept of truth meant something very 
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different from what it presently means; if the meaning which it 
once had was one which was given in a more integral relation to 
fundamental aspects of thinking, experience and life; then there 
would appear at least to be reason for raising anew the question: 
'what is truth?' Yet perhaps we are moving too quickly. Analytical 
thinkers might very well object to our second premise. One might 
ask: what difference does it make what the concept of truth once 
was? Why should it matter philosophically that a concept of truth 
found in the history of thought was given in an integral union with 
other concepts such as 'existence,' or 'being,' to say nothing of 
'experience and life?' This concept was either false or completely 
unverifiable, or else Heidegger himself would not find the occasion 
for exploring the question of truth again today. The essential task 
for thought is simply to attain the meaning of truth. By indicating 
the power and depth that the concept of truth had in the medieval 
world, does Heidegger mean to suggest that this concept was 
actually correct and accurate? Should we then discard our present 
concepts of truth and adopt medieval ones? 
The fact that Heidegger does not seriously recommend the 
latter, while at the same time touting the power which medieval 
concepts of truth once had in a manner which appeals to a deep 
human longing for an integral union of thought with being, 
something which no rational concept can ever provide, leaves him 
open to two charges: obfuscation and irrationalism. Heidegger 
obfuscates because there is an insidious confusion between the 
task at hand, which is to define the meaning of truth, and a matter 
of intellectual history wherein the concept of truth is made 
intelligible within a determinate historical context of meaning. The 
latter is quite independent of the question of the meaning of truth 
itself. His approach is irrational because an appeal is made, albeit 
veiled by the above act of obfuscation, to sublime feeling rather 
than strict criterion of intellectual rigor. 
In this context Rudolf Carnap's charge that metaphysicians 
such as Heidegger would have better expressed themselves through 
music than philosophy 1 8 appears to have real force. These are 
serious charges because they strike at the very center of a claim 
which is embodied in Heidegger's method: that our philosophical 
history is or can be intrinsically related to the ongoing creative 
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process of philosophical thinking itself. Again and again these 
charges have been made against Heidegger, and any attempt to 
defend his methodology must be prepared to offer an adequate 
defense against them. All too significantly in this regard, Marvin 
Färber singles out "On The Essence of Truth" as the place in which 
He idegge r ' s obfuscat ing i r ra t ional ism reaches its mos t 
paradigmatic form. 1 9 
The attempt to defend against the above charges inevitably 
takes us beyond the issue of historical methodology to a reflection 
on the meaning and nature of truth itself. The concept of truth 
expressed and embodied in our selected texts would radically call 
into question the presupposition of Heidegger ' s analytic-
phenomenological critics that the medieval concept of truth was 
either accurate or not. Although Heidegger does not make his 
methodology fully explicit in our selected texts, this methodology 
is fully consistent with that which is employed in the examination 
of other issues throughout his work. The issue of Being will serve 
as an example. Heidegger is clear that the issue of Being, this 
"most ancient and venerable" of philosophical issues, has time 
and again been neglected, distorted, co-opted, trivialized, reified, 
and forgotten in the history of Western thought. Yet he is equally 
clear that the same tradition or traditions, which have in various 
ways done violence to the issue of Being have likewise kept the 
question of Being alive. Hence it was the Being question, even in 
its concealment and disuse, which has been the driving issue of 
Western thought. 
Whether or not Heidegger is correct in his reading of Western 
philosophy, it should be obvious that he is operating with quite a 
subtle and complex concept of truth. This concept becomes quite 
explicit in sections 6-8 of "On the Essence of Truth." In section 6 
Heidegger introduces the concept of truth as aletheia or 
unconcealment. This concept naturally suggests that untruth should 
be concealment, yet Heidegger will steadfastly resist this most 
natural of moves: "Concealment deprives aletheia of disclosure 
yet it does not render it steresis (privation); rather concealment 
preserves what is proper to aletheia as its own." 2 0 Here it would 
be quite tempting to pursue this line of argument in defense of 
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Heidegger's historical method yet it would be more fruitful to 
review his general theory of truth instead. 
In all of our selected texts Heidegger is remarkably consistent 
in accepting correspondence as a fundamental aspect of truth. In 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic he writes: "The definition 
of truth is the starting point, not yet the answer; it is the point of 
departure for posing the problem, but is not yet the solution!" 2 1 In 
Being and Time: "Our analysis takes its departure from the 
traditional conception of truth and attempts to lay bare the 
ontological foundations of that conception." 2 2 
In each section in which Heidegger articulates his theory of 
truth he begins with specific everyday examples. In Being and 
Time the example is given of a picture hanging askew on the wall. 
In Metaphysical Foundations it is the color of the chalk board. 
"Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall 
makes the true assertion that the picture on the wall is hanging 
askew." 2 3 Heidegger then sets about to examine what it is that 
would make such a claim true. He concludes that this can be none 
other than the revealing of the state of affairs of the thing itself, of 
the picture hanging askew. "Asserting is a way of Being toward 
the Thing itself that is. And what does one's perceiving of it 
demonstrate? Nothing else than that this thing is the very entity 
which one has in mind in one's assertion." 2 4 In this manner 
Heidegger argues that the primary locus of truth does not lie in 
assertions, judgments, claims, or ideas but rather in the actual 
making present of a certain state of affairs. Heidegger famously 
credits the Greeks and in particular Aristotle for a dim and partial 
awareness, one quickly covered over by formal theories of this 
primordial essence of truth as "unconcealment." 
Western thinking in its beginning conceived this 
open region as ta alethea, the unconcealed. If we 
translate alethea as "unconceal-ment" rather than 
truth this translation is not merely more literal; it 
contains the directive to rethink the ordinary 
concept of truth in the sense of the correctness of 
statements and to rethink it back to that still 
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uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of 
beings. 2 5 
The character of Heidegger's position should be clear enough. 
Assertions, claims and judgments are founded modes of being, 
they are founded upon a more primary disclosure of a state of 
affairs which is only in the 'second moment' captured in the form 
of a determinate claim. It would therefore be superficial and short-
sighted to identify the essence of truth with judgments. We should 
rather understand the essence of truth to be present in disclosure 
which forms the basis of judgments. Thus in the statement "The 
picture on the wall is hanging askew," truth is present in the 
statement in only a limited or derived sense. The primary locus of 
truth is present only in the actual experience of viewing the position 
of the picture. 
The issue discussed above goes beyond that of how to define 
the essence of truth. In sections of Being and Time other than 44, 
and in Basic Problems as well, Heidegger goes to great length to 
attempt to demonstrate how language is not a primary locus of 
truth; meaning does not arise by amassing atomistic units to form 
a whole; rather language itself is a result of significance, which is 
a fundamental structure of human existence 2 6. Thus Heidegger's 
understanding of truth as disclosure exhibited thus far has wider 
significance in terms of his general theory of meaning. 
Yet specifically in terms of the issue of whe the r 
correspondence adequately captures the essence of truth, it might 
be claimed that the understanding of truth exhibited thus far would 
be open to the charge of equivocation. Obviously truth is present 
not simply in a disclosure of any state of affairs at all but rather in 
a disclosure of the precise state of affairs indicated in an assertion 
or a judgment. Truth is not contained in the picture hanging askew 
or even in the disclosure of this state of affairs, but rather in the 
fact that this state of affairs corresponds precisely to a previous 
judgment. Thus it might be argued that any attempt to reduce to a 
single aspect the complex way in which thinking and being are 
united in the form of judgment must result in solipsism. 
In fact Heidegger's position is not actually open to this line of 
objection at all. In "On the Essence of Truth" the question is raised 
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as to what is meant by "true gold." The claim that the true is 
essentially the actual is easily dismissed since false gold is just as 
actual as the true. Thus "true gold" can only mean a type of metal 
which corresponds with a preconceived concept of gold. "Genuine 
gold is that actual gold the actuality of which is in accordance 
with what always and in advance we 'properly' mean by gold." 2 7 
Once again Heidegger is well aware of the centrality of the 
concept of correspondence to truth, yet he will resist the temptation 
to identify the essence of truth with correspondence. His strategy 
consists instead of relentlessly probing the issue of what such 
correspondence can mean ontologically. In "On the Essence of 
Truth," Heidegger began his inquiry by asking how it is possible 
that intellect and thing, two dissimilar modes of being can at all 
correspond. If we were to unders tand this ques t ion as 
epistemological then we should rightly conclude as Marvin Färber 
does, that Heidegger is here engaged in a type of pretense, 
pretending originality for a question which has already been 
explored in abundant literature. 2 8 In fact Heidegger's question is 
ontological. Any attempt to put this question on a continuum with 
the abundant epistemological literature on the subject can only 
result in an essential misunderstanding. Moreover Heidegger's 
exploration of this ontological question is consistent throughout 
most of his writings on truth. It is in this ontological dimension 
that what is unique in Heidegger's theory of truth is contained. 
How then is correspondence possible ontologically? First, 
Heidegger would adamantly deny that such correspondence can 
be explained in terms of the traditional Cartesian notion of an 
isolated subject over and against an objective world. If this were 
a correct description of the ontological starting point for the act of 
knowledge, then correspondence would not be at all possible. It 
should be clear that the issue goes beyond that of knowledge, or 
rather it is prior to knowledge, having to do with that of the 
fundamental manner in which human beings are in a world 
ontologically. For Heidegger human beings are not simply present 
in a world as objects in a container, but rather being-in-a-world 
belongs to the basic ontological constitution of being human. 
"Being in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being 
of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state." 2 9 
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What Heidegger is rejecting in the traditional notion of truth 
as correspondence is the claim that truth is attained to the extent 
that an isolated and detached subject escapes the "cabinet" of 
consciousness to apprehend something which is external to it. 
Rather it should be said that human beings in their "first moment" 
already "dwell" in a world. It is only in terms of that "concernful," 
" circumspective" "absorption" in a world that any specific truth 
claims can be made. As Heidegger says in The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic: "We are rather always comporting ourselves 
towards the beings around us. Statements do not first bring about 
this relation, but rather the reverse is true. Statements are first 
possible on the basis of an always latent comportment to beings. 
... .We can say that making statements about X is only possible on 
the basis of having to do with X. "3U 
One significant aspect of Heidegger's understanding of truth 
is that it can to some extent be translated into modern 
epistemological language. From an epistemological perspective it 
is superficial and inaccurate to identify the essence of truth with 
correspondence. This is because correspondence presupposes a 
larger framework of meaning as its basis and ground. "That is a 
statement about X is true only because our dealing with that X 
already has a certain kind of truth." 3 1 Later on the same page 
Heidegger writes: "Prepositional truth is more primordially rooted, 
rooted in the already being by things. The latter occurs 'already,' 
before making statements since when? Always already! Already, 
that is, insofar as and as long as Dasein exists." 3 2 
In the example given earlier, "The picture on the wall is hanging 
askew," the very possibility of correspondence presupposes an 
anterior familiarity with the world, language, specific meanings 
to the words used, visual perception etc. Thus to identify the 
essence of truth with correspondence would not be accurate from 
an epistemological point of view. 
With this short overview of Heidegger's positive concept of 
truth we are now in a better position to defend against the kind of 
specific charges leveled against Heidegger's historical approach 
to truth cited previously. The essential character of these charges 
was expressed in the question: 'what difference does it make what 
the concept of truth once was?' In indicating the essential 
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connection which the medieval concept of truth had with 
experience and life in contrast to the modern one Heidegger is not 
appealing to irrational instinct or blind feeling. What is 
presupposed in this charge is that the medieval concept of truth 
was simply wrong. This presupposition is however too simplistic 
to have value. As we have seen, there are considered reasons why 
our modern concept of truth as correctness is epistemologically 
and ontologically inaccurate. Likewise in attempting to establish 
an enduring basis for correspondence the medievals understood 
that there are deep ontological grounds for our human experience 
of truth which cannot be simply expressed in terms of correctness. 
Above all the medievals understood that there is indeed a primordial 
connection of truth with Being. 
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